



British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

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East Timor

The war is far from over, says Murdani

General Murdani now admits that resistance fighters and their supporters in the bush probably total about 10,000 people, and that they "never fight in one group . . . (but) in splinters" (that is, mobile, small guerrilla units). This largely confirms the analysis of guerrilla strength worked out on the basis of information from inside East Timor before the commencement of the 1983 offensive (see Budiardjo and Liem, *The War Against East Timor*, Zed Books, 1984).

At the time the offensive was launched, Murdani stated his objective as being:

This time, no fooling around. We are going to hit them without mercy. If this call (for surrender) goes unheeded, the government will use its armed forces and all its arsenal to clean up the remnants of Fretilin rebels.

(*The Age*, Melbourne, 18 August 1983)

But in an interview with *Reuters* on 17 December, Murdani admitted that the war could not be ended in one or two years. "I'm not saying there's no end in sight but it will take some time to resolve." Murdani also said that

- ★ Indonesian troops are being ambushed "once in a while",
- ★ "some of our weapons, ammo, gets into their hands",
- ★ Indonesia has 14 battalions of between 500 and 550 troops in East Timor with between 400 and 450 from each battalion doing line duty,
- ★ Air Force jets are carrying out bombing runs though this "did not happen regularly".

Although the interview was given to a foreign news agency, it was clearly directed among others at critics within the Army who have become impatient with Murdani's inability to crush the resistance in East Timor despite all the blustering threats he has made. He concentrated on trying to explain why it was taking so long to defeat Fretilin and claimed, quoting (US) General Westmoreland's dictum, that Indonesia must struggle to win "the hearts and minds of the (East Timorese) people".

The Catholic Church in East Timor came in for its share of the blame for Murdani's failure on the battlefield. He complained that large-scale conventional warfare could not be launched (sic) for fear of "exacerbating religious differences between the Catholic Timorese and the predominantly Muslim troops". He accused the priests of "giving the people the wrong information" and suggested that the Church was upset because it could no longer play a part in the decision-making process as it had done under the Portuguese. What he didn't say was, that since the Indonesian invasion, the Church in East Timor had ceased being part of the establishment and had been transformed into a people's Church, a

transformation due largely to the extreme brutality of Indonesian rule.

400 strategic villages being set up

Four hundred *desa binaan* ("guided" or strategic villages) are being set up in East Timor and will be located "in areas which can be easily supervised and patrolled". The Timorese puppet governor of the "province" of East Timor, Mario Carascalao, said this would allow the province to solve its security problems. He explained that the project was being managed jointly by the provincial government (under the control of the heavily-militarised Department of the Interior) and the Armed Forces.

A previous announcement about these villages spoke only of 200 *desa binaan* (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 65, September 1984) and gave the villages their full name, *desa binaan pangkal perlawanan* ("guided villages as bases for resistance").

It is not yet clear whether this new style of population control simply means the reinforcement, on existing sites, of the so-called *daerah pemukiman* ("resettlement areas") into which almost the entire Timorese population was herded during and after the encirclement and annihilation campaign of 1977-79, or will be located on new sites, thus involving the wholesale removal of hundreds of thousands of people.

A *Sinar Harapan* editorial (28 November 1984), commenting on the 400 new strategic villages, makes it clear that security restrictions are still very much in force throughout East Timor. Asserting that security disorders are under control in some parts, the paper suggests that in such regions, it was now time to lift security restrictions that were formerly needed but which can only obstruct people's participation (in development activity). This would make it possible to isolate those regions where Fretilin remnants still have their networks. In fact, the reconstructed villages are clearly designed to tighten security control, not loosen it, as *Sinar Harapan* recommends. They conform with standard counter-insurgency techniques employed in many other countries, Malaya, Vietnam, Guatemala and Rhodesia, to mention just a few.

The new plans in East Timor are related to efforts by the military regime to intensify economic exploitation even while the war is still in progress. Last November, Indonesia's Capital Investment Co-ordinating Board (BKPM) announced that the territory has potentially large amounts of manganese, gold, marble, iron, coal and gas, a sure sign that domestic and foreign capital is being invited to invest in the region.

Indonesia and Portugal secret talks

Secret negotiations about the future of East Timor are now in progress between Indonesia and Portugal, increasing the danger of a deal between the two countries behind the backs of the East Timorese people. This would enable the present and former colonial masters of East Timor to persuade the UN to drop the issue from the General Assembly agenda.

The first round of negotiations lasting several days was held at the UN headquarters in New York in November. The second round was to have taken place in December but was postponed till January and scheduled to commence on the 11th. The UN Secretary-General's special deputy for East Timor affairs, the Pakistani diplomat, Achmed Rafeeuddin, attended the opening and closing sessions of the November round of talks. Portugal was represented by a three-man team, headed by Portugal's ambassador to the UN, Mr Rui Medina. On the Indonesian side, Alex Alatas, ambassador to the UN was accompanied by a person identified only as "Luis", presumably a Timorese and described as "a diplomatic functionary from Jakarta".

The secret talks follow the consultations held under UN auspices over the past year or so, on the basis of the 1982 UN General Assembly resolution (37/30) which instructed the UN Secretary-General "to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the (East Timor) problem". Like the earlier consultations, the present negotiations simply ignore the East Timorese people. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Mr Perez de Cuellar, on 10 August 1984, Lord Avebury, chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group drew attention to the failure to draw the Fretilin into the consultations and said:

Frankly, I do not think you will succeed unless you follow the dictates of common sense . . . and include the East Timorese on your agenda of consultations.

The underlying factors that have forced both Indonesia and Portugal to the negotiating table are Indonesia's failure to crush the resistance in East Timor and continuing international support, both inside and outside the UN, for a genuine act of self-determination that would pave the way for the country's independence. These are the critical stumbling-blocks to Indonesia's and Portugal's over-riding wish to have East Timor wiped off the UN agenda for ever. Portugal's problem too is that the continuing dispute with Indonesia obstructs its relations with other countries in Southeast Asia. Even more important is the pressure now coming from member-states of the European Community as negotiations for Portugal's accession reach the concluding stages. Already more than a year ago, President Mitterand, contradicted his earlier support for the principle of self-determination of East Timor by announcing that France would stop abstaining at the UN because of the importance his socialist government attaches to expanding economic ties with Indonesia. The Community looks upon Indonesia as an important trading partner and market for arms, and it would be awkward to accept a new member-state that is still in dispute with Indonesia over such a fundamental issue as East Timor's right to self-determination.

The process leading to the present negotiations was facilitated by the visit to Lisbon in September last year of the Australian Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden. Press reports at the time of Hayden's visit were full of remarks about a "breakthrough" in contacts between Portugal and Indonesia. For Hayden, the problem was to convince Portugal not to recognise Fretilin as representing the East Timorese and therefore a legitimate party to the negotiations. In turn, Portugal's Foreign Minister, Jaime Gama, complained to Hayden about Australia's seabed negotiations with Indonesia over exploitation of oil reserves in the

so-called Timor Gap. He protested that the talks implied Australia's recognition of Indonesia's claim to a territory that was still under Portuguese jurisdiction. Since then, Australia and Indonesia have striven to avoid giving offence to Portugal by discussing oil exploitation as a joint venture, thus putting aside for the time being any question of territorial recognition. The Portuguese government however needed little encouragement to refrain from recognising Fretilin; it has never done so in any case. President Eanes, who under the Constitution, exercises special powers over East Timor, was apparently more difficult to convince, but has veered to a position that denies Fretilin any recognition, taking his cue from the failure so far of the UN to give Fretilin recognition as a liberation movement. (He should for once perhaps take his cue from General Murdani—he knows more than most about the reality of Fretilin's existence!)

Terms of the negotiations

In one critical respect, the present negotiations can be interpreted as a climb-down for Indonesia which always insists that East Timor is an "internal affair" and thus not a matter for multilateral/UN or bilateral consideration. The fact however that Indonesia has now made a "concession" by negotiating with Portugal would suggest that the generals in Jakarta believe that the outcome of the bilateral negotiations will make the "climb-down" worth while. Before negotiations began, the two sides apparently agreed to certain "concessions". As a pure formality, Indonesia "conceded" that by entering into talks, Portugal would not thereby imply recognition of East Timor as an Indonesian province. Portugal was thus persuaded to agree not to raise the question of self-determination, even though it is constitutionally obliged to do so, but to confine the talks to "human rights and humanitarian affairs". The human rights question that was raised during the November talks concerned the repatriation of Timorese still holding Portuguese citizenship who worked for the Portuguese colonial regime prior to 1975. By all accounts, the matter did not proceed very far since Indonesia failed to produce the promised list of names; nor was the list supplied in time for the talks planned in December, which in any case did not take place because the Indonesians did not turn up. The pitfall in starting with such a topic is that these potential repatriants can be used by Indonesia as political hostages to an ultimate complete climb-down by Portugal on every single issue from self-determination downwards.

The myth of provincial autonomy

The opinion is apparently gaining ground in government circles in Portugal that the interests of the East Timorese people could best be served by persuading Indonesia to grant special autonomy rights to East Timor as an Indonesian province. Knowing so little about Indonesian history, there are some people who believe that this provided a satisfactory solution for Aceh in North Sumatra in the late 1950s when the Darul Islam leader, Daud Beureuh, was persuaded to agree to Aceh becoming a *Daerah Istimewa* (Special District) with himself as District Head. This arrangement left Aceh in fundamentally the same position as any other province, except only in matters of religious instruction, customary law and education. It is no coincidence that these are precisely the areas that Portuguese colonial circles would like to see preserved in East Timor, as a means of retaining some elements of the Portuguese tradition in East Timor. Needless to say, the population of East Timor has not sacrificed one third of its men, women and children to defend Portuguese culture. There should be no illusions in anyone's minds: "Special District" status in Indonesia's highly centralised system of government, reinforced by the predominant and extremely repressive machinery of military administration, means absolutely nothing.

The present secret negotiations are ominously reminiscent of

the talks between Indonesia and Holland in 1962, under US and UN auspices, which led to the complete sell-out of the West Papuan people. Holland then was under pressure from the West, particularly the USA, to accept Indonesia's demand for annexation. The New York Agreement of 1962 paid lip-service to Holland's concern about an act of self-determination in West Papua. The Agreement was vague enough and the UN unconcerned enough to leave the West Papuan people without protection against the forces of occupation which made sure that the 1969 Act of "Free" Choice gave them no choice at all. A similar deal may satisfy government circles in Lisbon that the people of East Timor will be consulted by the military regime, but it is idle fancy for anyone to think that such a deal will find acceptance by the East Timorese people.

ICRC still excluded from relief work, says ICRC President

The president of the International Committee for the Red Cross, M. Alexandre Hay, has drawn attention to East Timor as one of the few countries where the ICRC is prevented from giving relief to the victims of a military conflict. At a press conference in Geneva on 10 January, the ICRC president said many countries, among them Indonesia, were making it impossible for the Committee to operate in accordance with Geneva conventions governing the conduct of war.

All ICRC relief activity on the island of East Timor came to a halt in July 1983 when the Indonesian government withdrew facilities a month before launching the August 1983 military offensive. Since then, ICRC activities have been confined to making food and medical provisions for prisoners on the island of Atauro, administering a family reunion programme for Timorese wishing to join relatives in Portugal, and occasional prison visits. During 1984, the ICRC was permitted to visit East Timorese political prisoners on three occasions, in March, June and September. The places of detention are not confined to East Timor; they include Comarca Prison (Dili), prisons in Kupang (West Timor), Los Palos, Viqueque and Baucau as well as

Cipinang Prison (Jakarta) and Tangerang Prison (West Java). According to available figures, the number of Timorese political prisoners in these places of detention in late 1984 was as follows:

Kupang (14), Los Palos (75), Baucau (29), Viqueque (23), Comarca (188), Cipinang (12), Tangerang (1), and Atauro (2,141).



A Timorese woman, Dominggus da Costa, is now being held in Tangerang Prison, West Java. She was sentenced in Dili to six years for supporting Fretilin. She has a child with her in prison. (*Sinar Harapan* 23 November 1984.)

Birth control for all women of child-bearing age

The Indonesian administration intends to impose a birth-control programme in East Timor that will involve no fewer than 95,000 women, a figure which cannot be much less than the entire number of women of child-bearing age (with total population at less than 600,000). The official plan for East Timor during the Five-Year Plan (1984-1989) claims that 20,000 women (*pengikut lestari*) are already practising birth control, whilst an additional 75,000 will become new "acceptors" before the current Five-Year Plan ends. The intensity of the programme is aimed at "preventing an increase in the population of the province". For a territory whose population has been decimated by Indonesian depravities since 1975, that is cynicism at its most blatant.

The provincial programme also envisages that "6,800 transmigrants" will be settled in the province in the same period. Normally, figures for transmigration are given in "family heads" and we know that 500 "model" families from Bali and Java have been resettled recently in the south-west region of Kovalima. At 4 or 5 persons per family, the latest figure suggests that there will be a two-fold increase in the number of outsiders brought into East Timor in the coming four years. These figures exclude non-sponsored transmigrants as well as the thousands of military and non-military personnel now running the administration and security affairs. Everything points to the determination of the military regime to swamp the country with outsiders and turn the Timorese into a minority in their own country within the shortest possible time.

This valuable collection of documents has just been produced by the International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs (Denmark). 218 pages, with illustrations.

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IWGIA Document 50

Torben Retbøll (ed.)

EAST TIMOR: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES



Australian ICJ mission warns against involuntary repatriation

The Mission of 5 lawyers from the Australian section of the International Commission of Jurists and a member of the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights which visited West Papuan refugee camps along the PNG-Indonesian border in September almost didn't take place. Though visas had been granted and permission given for camps to be visited, the government in Port Moresby had last-minute reservations, and only intensive phone-calls and other communications managed to save the venture.

Moreover, the camps have now been declared off-limits to journalists and almost everyone else, so Australian ICJ's investigations could well be the last for some considerable time. PNG Prime Minister Somare recently justified this uncooperative stand, saying he didn't want the camps "to become a tourist attraction".

Reading the Mission's report which was made public on 10 December, the reasons for Port Moresby's stand are fairly obvious. It was the Mission's considered opinion that "a large number of the approximately 11,000 refugees now consider themselves to be indefinitely or permanently displaced from Irian Jaya", that "this large number of people are either refugees within the terms of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees" and that this "is an indication of serious problems within Irian Jaya". (page 58) The Mission's crucial recommendation was therefore that "no one be returned involuntarily" (page 59)

The 62-page Mission Report provides an important analysis of the inviolability of the principle of "*non-refoulement*" which obliges all countries, whether or not they are signatories of the UN Convention and Protocol on Refugees, not to force people to return against their will to their country of origin where they fear they will be persecuted. This is particularly important since neither PNG nor Indonesia are signatories. The Mission argues

that even non-party States have certain international law obligations in relation to refugees. Such obligations may be found in the human rights provisions of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. In particular, it appears that the principle of non-refoulement has become a part of customary international law binding on all States so as to forbid the return of refugees other than in circumstances of voluntary repatriation. (page 25-36)

All camps visited

The Missions split into two groups so as to visit all the camps in the short time at their disposal. They interviewed a large number of refugees, some individually and some in groups, and also spoke at length with relief workers, church leaders and local officials dealing on a day-to-day basis with the refugees. After arriving in the border region, they were told of a hitherto unannounced large camp in the Western Province. (page 35)

The following are some samples of their findings in the camps:


Kungim Refugees here have come from five villages in Mindiptana. In some cases, the entire village population fled as, for example, villagers from Ingembit who fled after Indonesian troops carried out *operasi turun* ("going-down" operation) when they entered the villages of Woropka, Tinika and Ninati, and shot indiscriminately in the church, the school and in homes. The refugees here were unanimous that they would not return to the village if the Indonesians did not leave.

Komopkin This camp with some 2,000 inhabitants was hit by starvation in July and August when around one hundred people died, largely through lack of help from the authorities (pages 56 and 57). The Mission also visited some Komopkin refugees being treated in Rumginae Mission Hospital. 165 of the refugees at Komopkin had returned voluntarily . . . to join the OPM! Unlike those in Kungim, most refugees here seemed to know a lot about the OPM. Most had fled their villages, also in Mindiptana, after shoot-ups by Indonesian troops in April; many had taken months to cross the border. The entire population of Ninati had fled, all 755 people. Here too refugees spoke of troops shooting up a church (all refugees were Christians), a

report corroborated by the Bishop of Kiunga who told the Mission that villagers had gathered desecrated religious items and brought them to him. No one at this camp expressed a willingness to go home, except to join the OPM.

Green River Many here are traditional border-crossers who now regard themselves as refugees because they are afraid to return to their villages. Most had also left in April, and gave as their reason their desire for independence from Indonesia, their fear of losing their land or their fear of Indonesian soldiers. Most denied that the OPM had told them to move, though a small number said OPM had been a factor. Villagers from Umuaf said troops had killed 8 of their people who stayed behind as a punishment for the departure of the others. Most striking about those in Green River was that many had been driven off their land some years ago (some, for instance, in 1973) and had been living in the bush since then. Others said they often abandoned their villages for a while when they became scared because of military operations.

Kamberatoro Most refugees came in April, mainly of the Dera



Refugee camps along the PNG-West Papua border


clan. Another 200 arrived in June from the Senggi district. Here, refugees gave reports about the killing of local teachers, which had scared everyone not only the teachers. Some now in Kamberatoro said they had crossed into PNG in 1978, then returned home but had since then lived in the bush because they were afraid to return to their village. Here again, many refugees said they had been living in the bush for many years. The following is typical:

A man from Komando told us that his people had left (their village) in 1978. There had been a history of dissatisfaction with the Indonesian military—soldiers would claim people's land and all that was on it on payment of an unfairly small sum. But the particular trigger for the 1978 exodus appeared to have been the disappearance of public servants in the area. They (the villagers) had lived in the bush since 1978 but crossed into PNG in March 1984 when Indonesian soldiers chased them. (pages 45–46)

The Mission concludes that the people from the Senggi district "seemed to be the only people at Kamberatoro who had not left their villages prior to 1984". (page 46)

Blackwater Creek (near Vanimo) Most refugees here are political activists, former civil servants and army deserters. (Recently, the PNG government announced that about 500 at this camp had been designated refugees who would be found asylum and definitely not returned.) Most said they would face trial—or worse—if forced to return. There were several members of Arnold Ap's Mambesak group here, and also his widow, Cory Ap and their children. A small number here said they wanted to go home, but some made the point that they would only do so if allowed to return straight to their village. Some people here were tradesmen and fishermen who had particular complaints about Sulawesi traders in Jayapura who

Refugees in Black Wara



Tombu (Tom) Ireeuw, lecturer at Cendrawasih University, Jayapura.

paid very low prices for their products. They said fighting often broke out with these traders, "on several occasions leading to a number of killings. One such occasion was around the time of the planned uprising (in February 1984)." (page 49)

The following words of one refugee sums up fears expressed about transmigration:

They take many parcels of land without proper payment. People lose their lands. People are not paid much attention by the government, only transmigrants. And then they become slowly separated from their lands . . . We feel that slowly, in future, we will become aliens in our own environment. And our culture, the values of our culture, are being broken by outside culture from Java or other Indonesian islands. And later we will become a minority in our own land. And also the influence of Islam because many of the transmigrants are Islamic people

The Mission also collected testimony here about the murder of Arnold Ap. His body had been found in a cave.

Soldiers took it to the military hospital and planned a secret burial, but a hospital employee recognised the corpse and word got out. The body was then taken to Arnold Ap's house where it was washed and placed in another coffin for burial. Our informant, who had known Ap for some years, was present and told us that Ap's arms were broken and he had bayonet wounds in his sides and stomach. (page 51)

The Mission calls for an inquiry into the circumstances of Ap's death "in view of statements made by the Indonesian government conflicting with evidence made available to the Mission and to others". (page 61)

Note: Anyone wishing to obtain a copy of the Report should write to: Friends of West Papua, PO Box K717, Haymarket, NSW 2000, Australia.



Arnold Ap's 8-year-old son with Marthen Rumabar, member of Mambesak Group.

Refugees repatriated in secret

Ninety-nine West Papuan refugees at the Black Wara Camp near Vanimo on the north coast of Papua New Guinea, not far from the border with Indonesia, were repatriated to Indonesia under cover of strict secrecy by the PNG authorities on 22 December. The refugees, 23 men, 23 women and 53 children, had expressed a willingness to go back to their village which is not far from the border, but were told they would be escorted back to the border, then allowed to make their way home on foot. The villagers come from the village of Workwana, in the sub-district of Arso.

Their repatriation however turned out very differently. Without the knowledge of the camp authorities, 102 refugees were taken away in darkness at 4am by PNG riot police squads and taken to the wharf at Vanimo. When an Indonesian vessel arrived, they were told to go on board to be transported back to Jayapura, the capital of the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya.

Three of the men made a getaway, feeling they had been betrayed.

The UN High Commission for Refugees was altogether excluded from the operation, contrary to promises by both the PNG and Indonesian governments that they would be allowed to monitor repatriation. The Sydney paper, **National Times**, (28 December 1984) reports that UNHCR officials were angry about being ignored. The only officials who accompanied the refugees from the PNG side were agents from the National Intelligence Organisation and the PNG defence Force intelligence. They only escorted the refugees back to Jayapura, then returned immediately to PNG without waiting to see what happened.

The operation has brought a protest from Bishop John Etheridge of Vanimo who helps to run the Black Wara camp. While he agreed that the refugees in question had wanted to

return home, "rounding them up under cover of darkness was a bad move". They wanted to travel overland, he said (*Times of PNG*, 30 December, 1984). In fact, their village is much nearer Vanimo than Jayapura and the journey home would have been an easy one.

Greg Mongi, secretary of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Port Moresby, afterwards warned the PNG government against being a party to displacing the West Papuans.

New PNG Foreign Minister

The under-cover operation which was also kept secret from the churches and the West Sepik provincial government, is being linked to the appointment just a few days earlier, of a new PNG Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister Rabbie Namaliu, though willing to work bilaterally with Jakarta on repatriation, has upset the Indonesian government on a number of occasions, most recently by his outspoken remarks at the UN General Assembly in 1984 on the border conflict between PNG and Indonesia. His successor, John Giheno, a former Police Minister, is described by the *National Times* as "a knockabout politician" who is expected to launch a policy of getting tough over the border, including moving more firmly against the OPM (the West Papuan liberation movement). He played a key role in the controversy over the Australian TV *Four Corners* programme on the border issue, when the PNG Prime Minister tried unsuccessfully to force the ABC to delete an interview with OPM leader John Nyaro.

The return of the 99 on board an Indonesian vessel gave the government authorities in Jayapura the opportunity to treat the event as a ceremony for public relations purposes. All top provincial officials including the military commander, Major-General Maliana Sembiring, the governor, Izaak Hindom and the Deputy Governor, Brigadier-General Sugiyono, were there to welcome the refugees back. They were told that new houses had been built for them in their village, and that the development of nucleus estates in the Arso region would give them the chance to advance their economic conditions.

More refugees arriving as some go home

Claims made recently by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja that as many as two thousand refugees

may already have trickled back home have been discounted by people closely monitoring affairs in PNG. "The refugees are by no means convinced that it is safe to go back", said a relief worker. They will hear stories about Indonesian military operations and as a result, their political determination is hardening. Many refugees are saying they will never go home." (*The Guardian*, London, 15 January 1985.)

The PNG press reports that nearly five hundred West Papuans crossed over from Indonesia in December. They fled, they told PNG border officials, because Indonesian troops had again been raiding villages and destroying food crops and houses. The refugees thought the new operations were in retaliation for the attack on an Indonesian repatriation team by refugees at the Vanimo refugee camp in November. (See *TAPOL Bulletin* No.66, November 1984.) The refugees have arrived at Green River camp in several groups, swelling the number of refugees there from about 200 to 687. As a result, conditions in the makeshift huts that have been built with bush material supplied by local villagers are now very overcrowded.

Murdani's tough Christmas message

Meanwhile, Armed Forces Commander, General Benny Murdani, who flew into Irian Jaya from East Timor to spend the post-Christmas days in Indonesia's other trouble-spot, used the occasion to deliver a warning that the Armed Forces will act firmly against anyone who speaks or acts in a way that could divide the Indonesian nation. People should not think along religious or ethnic lines but only as part of the great Indonesian nation.

Murdani's speech to a gathering of local community leaders and government officials in Wamena, the capital of Jayawijaya District, is a reflection of the army's determination to stamp out ethnic differences and enforce a standard Indonesian (read: Javanese) pattern everywhere. He told his mainly Papuan audience that the newcomers (ie. transmigrants) were coming to "advance their friends in Irian Jaya. Look upon them as people from the same Indonesian roots as yourselves, not as part of an effort to colonise you". But people should also realise, he said, that the Indonesian government is not rich enough to develop this great nation of ours all at once, quickly and everywhere. "Be assured that Irian Jaya will one day get its turn to receive the proper attention." (*Sinar Harapan*, 27 December 1984.)

He also dealt with the other main cause for unrest in the province, the feeling that a mainly Christian population is being swamped by outsiders who are Muslims.

Police attacked in Tanah Merah

Two Indonesian police officers who were on their way from Tanah Merah to Mindiptana in the district of Merauke, were attacked by OPM fighters when they stopped at the village of Mawan intending to stay overnight. The house where they were staying was suddenly surrounded by OPM guerrillas armed with knives and firearms. The policemen tried to disarm the guerrilla who entered the house but were fired upon and decided to flee for their lives back to Tanah Merah. With bullets whizzing around them, they made a getaway, and returned separately to base.

A report of the incident appeared in *Sinar Harapan* (10 January), an unusual thing to happen. The Chief of Police of Irian Jaya refused to respond to questions from the daily about the skirmish, except to say that the two officers had been given "a warm welcome" on their return to Merauke.



The 1985-86 Budget gives government employees a rise—*kenaikan gaji*—of 20%, but puts an across-the-board new tax of 10% on petroleum. Many commentators agree that this and other budgetary decisions will cause considerable price rises—*kenaikan harga*. (Cartoon from *Sinar Harapan*.)

Britain's arms exports to Indonesia escalate

British Aerospace, the company which several years ago sold Hawk ground-attack aircraft to Indonesia, has now won a major new contract to supply Indonesia with its Rapier air-defence missile system. The Rapier is a short-range, light, highly mobile ground-to-air missile system which is said to have "performed well in the Falklands war". The system is transportable by air or land. The contract, worth £100 million, comes after "a concerted effort by British Aerospace and Ministry of Defence officials in recent months". (Financial Times, 14 December 1984.) This effort culminated in an extended visit to Indonesia by Britain's Chief of Defence Staff, Sir Edwin Bramall in November. (See TAPOL Bulletin No. 66, November 1984.) The deal comes hard on the heels of another deal under which Britain is supplying the Indonesian Navy with three refitted frigates worth £26.6 million.

The Rapier System and Indonesia's new strike force

Under a major reorganisation of the Indonesian Armed Forces which is due to commence in a few months' time, the Indonesian Army will further bolster its rapid deployment force capability as the main form of "defence" against "enemy forces". In Indonesian army parlance, the rapid deployment force is to be known as *Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat (PPRC)*.

The PPRC is the latest development of the Army's strike force which has for nearly three decades been its main combat element. The first strike-force commander was Achmed Yani, the general who led the expeditionary force against the regional rebellion based in West Sumatra in 1958, and the man who, as Army Chief-of-Staff, was murdered in October 1965 in the Suharto-manipulated coup. Already in 1961, the strike force had been unified into a corps called CADUAD, under the command of Major-General (now General) Suharto. Suharto remained commander when CADUAD was upgraded as a command and called KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserve Command) in 1963. It had by that time become the most powerful force in the army, virtually free from the control of the Army General Staff. It was from this extremely powerful vantage point that Suharto took power in October 1965. The strike-force troops, notably the paracommandos known as the RPKAD (now Kopassandha), were used under Suharto's direction to spearhead the massacres of late 1965 when an estimated one million people were killed and many mass organisations were physically annihilated, including the three-million strong Indonesian Communist Party. Since then, the strike-force element under KOSTRAD has been used on many occasions in attempts to crush resistance to Indonesian rule in West Papua and East Timor.


The Army's current "defence" strategy is focussed on its updated strike force, the PPRC which is being developed as part of KOSTRAD. According to *Sinar Harapan* (29 November 1984), the plan is to maintain troops in various parts of the country in a constant state of alert, ready to be transported within hours to "trouble-spots" anywhere in the archipelago. The main target for PPRC forays will clearly be local upheavals and possible

widespread demonstrations or "riots", but another task for the PPRC will be to defend key economic installations built in far-flung parts of the country such as North and West Sumatra, Kalimantan and West Papua which could conceivably come under attack from some external attacker. These installations are so expensive and vital to the present economic structure, the paper says, that it is not possible for the Army to retreat to the hills and wage guerrilla struggle as happened (or was supposed to happen) during the early years of the Republic. The projects must be defended against possible seizure or destruction.


The Rapier air-defence system is clearly integral to this rapid deployment force strategy. While it is not likely to be used against Fretilin or the OPM (the very ones who stand in need of air defences), the Rapiers will help to reinforce the PPRC, the spearhead force directed against the people for purposes of repression and subjugation.

In British government terms, the Rapier deal is "a significant breakthrough" in what is seen as a rapidly expanding market for other British arms manufacturers. British Aerospace, which prides itself on being Britain's No.1 manufacturing exporter and has won the Queen's Award for Exporting for two years running, apparently hopes to sell even more Rapiers than those covered under the contract signed last month, as more Indonesian officers will be undergoing training in Britain than are actually required for the present system. (*Financial Times*, 3 January 1985.) The company also hopes to follow this up with the sale of a new generation of Hawk fighters—the 200 series—to the Indonesian Air Force. One of the reasons for the company's optimism is that Washington is showing reluctance about supplying Indonesia with F-16 jet fighters which are, in any case, about three times as expensive as the Hawks.

The Rapier deal also represents a breakthrough in the sense that other war equipment can be expected to lengthen the list of Indonesian purchases from the UK. Furthermore, many Indonesian officers will be coming here for training while British Aerospace personnel will be closely involved in back-up and other services in Indonesia.



Rapiers on the move



Tempo (22 December 1984) describes the Rapier System being purchased from Britain as a highly mobile, easy-to-operate system with a fail-safe device against hitting your own aircraft. It will be used especially to protect "vital" installations in Java and Aceh and will be operated by the Army's Air Defence Artillery unit.

Combat-tested warships for Indonesian navy

The three "Tribal"-class frigates purchased from Britain last August by the Indonesian Navy were on active service throughout the Falklands war. Prior to that, these three vessels, HMS Gurka, HMS Zulu and HMS Tartar, were to have been scrapped but the war changed all that and they have now been refitted with the most up-to-date missiles and radar equipment for target detection and defence against missile attack, including two 112-mm guns and "seacat" anti-aircraft missiles.

The exceptional suitability of British naval vessels for the Indonesian Navy is discussed at length in an article in **Sinar Harapan** (18 December 1984). The important thing about vessels of war, it writes, is that the weaponry and radar equipment on board must be as up-to-date as possible. Ships have a "hull life" of anything up to 30 years, yet missiles and radar equipment are developing so fast that the most attractive vessels are those that are adaptable enough to be refitted with the latest in weapons of destruction. Britain's experience during the Falklands war, in particular the "shock-waves" that hit warship designers and navies around the world when the HMS Sheffield was sunk by French-supplied exocet missiles early in the war, led to a major overhaul of detection equipment and its location on board a warship. In fact, the article stresses, the HMS Sheffield disaster vindicated the views of the US Navy officer, Vice-Admiral Julian S. Lake, who told a seminar in 1980 that warships built in

peacetime are never as efficient as warships built in wartime. Thus, Britain's experience of sea-based warfare in the South Atlantic, gained at the expense of hundreds of Argentinian and British lives, has made it possible for arms manufacturers in this country to capitalise by winning new contracts for equipment that has been refined by the best teacher of all, real-life war.

Sinar Harapan also points out that the advantage of the British deal rests in the low cost and quick delivery. It would take two to four years to secure delivery of new frigates which would cost anything up to \$60 million each. By contrast, the three British frigates are as good as new, have been supplied within months at a total cost of only \$30 million (about £26.6 million), and are guaranteed to last at least 10 years.

Oddly enough, while speaking at length about the value to the Indonesian Armed Forces of battle-tested bargains from Britain, **Sinar Harapan** seems to have been under some constraint about publicising the fact that it is Indonesia who has purchased the frigates named Gurka, Zulu and Tartar. It writes only that the vessels were bought by "a certain country". Perhaps the military authorities in Jakarta are worried that, by drawing too much attention to their burgeoning arms trade with Britain, pressure could develop here against the current upsurge in Britain's support for the military region.



The Tanjung Priok massacre

Many illegal documents have appeared in Indonesia since the bloody massacre of demonstrators by troops in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta's harbour region, on Wednesday 12 September. TAPOL has compiled the following report from information contained in recently received illegal documents, counter-checked against information from other reliable sources:

- ★ The incident was provoked by a local army officer's visit to *Assa'dah Mushollah* (prayer-house) when he demanded that wall notices for future sermons be removed. (Many local preachers have attacked government policy, particularly the requirement that all social and religious-based organisations abandon their own ideological principles and adopt the State ideology as their sole principle.)
- ★ A few days later, army officers returned to the *mushollah* which they entered without removing their boots and threw gutter-water on wall-notices that had not been removed.
- ★ When *mushollah* representatives sought redress from local officials for their grievances against the army officers' behaviour and invited one of the officers to discuss the matter at a local office, the two men were arrested, as well as another congregant nearby. Later, the chairman of the *mushollah* was also arrested.
- ★ A rally took place on 12 September demanding the release of the four men because efforts so far had failed to get any response from the military authorities.
- ★ A large, unarmed crowd then marched to the local army and police offices to press their demand. Speeches at the rally had been relayed by loudspeakers over a wide area, as is the practice. By the time the marchers began, the streets were lined with heavily-armed troops.
- ★ The demonstrators were stopped short by a company of air artillery troops which has barracks in the area, and by three truckloads of troops armed with automatic weapons. Without warning, the troops fired direct into the crowd. Hundreds fell. Some of the injured who rose to their feet were killed by

bayonets. Bystanders who tried to help the injured were shot.

- ★ Apart from a few of the injured who got away to local hospitals, local inhabitants were prevented from retrieving the bodies or helping the injured. Soon after the massacre, army trucks arrived to haul off the bodies and remove the injured, all of whom were transported to the Army Hospital in Jakarta. All other hospitals were instructed not to accept any casualties from the tragedy. Fire engines soon arrived on the scene to wash away all signs of blood on the street.
- ★ The most comprehensive account of the massacre puts the number of dead at 63 and the number of seriously wounded at over a hundred. The speed of the Army's cover-up operation explains why estimates of the casualties have been so difficult to confirm.
- ★ General Benny Murdani, Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief was present throughout the operation, watched its progress with Major-General Tri Sutrisno, Jakarta Military Commander, and is reported to have walked over the sprawled bodies of the dead and injured.



A mother's letter

Assalamu'alaikum wa rahmatullah wa barakatuhu. I am Zuchra I. Biki, the mother of the late Amir Biki.

On 12 September 1984 my son was killed by the regime's automatic weapons. While I have sincerely accepted Allah's will, my heart still laments my late son's departure. As my first grief has begun to cease, I wish to complain to the Indonesian people. Since the newspapers cannot express my feelings, I have therefore chosen this way. Far from being instigated and far from any feeling of revenge, I fully realise that what I am doing now is in the interest of the people and the state.

Officially, our state is based on Pancasila. Up to now, I could accept the possibility that the authorities could sincerely experience as well as put Pancasila into practice. But after the security forces of the authorities butchered the masses at Tanjung Priok on Wednesday 12 September 1984, I have become convinced that the government has not, however, experienced Pancasila, let alone put it into practice. How on earth could we find Pancasila which declares "just and civilised humanitarianism" while the government did nothing to prevent its forces from firing

their automatic weapons at the "demonstration of feeling" by the masses. Couldn't they deal with the situation by using fire engines, tear-gas, batons, and so on, for example, as practiced in other countries? The "show of feeling" was not an act of war.

As he previously often did, my son made an attempt to mediate between the people and the authorities. Nevertheless, the same methods he used to apply now appeared to fail in securing the release of his four innocent colleagues, detained by the Military District Command, for whom Amir Biki felt he had some moral responsibility. So it was a "show of feeling" which he wished to stage, and he even gave a warning that no one should resort to rowdiness.

Amir Biki was not the "leader of an irresponsible illegal gang" whose life had to be terminated by bullet. In 1966 he was in the forefront commanding the "Tendean Battalion/Arif Rahman Hakim" university students regiment and was taking part in establishing the "New Order". It was only his hand and leg which received injury during that "show of feeling" for the restoration of the 1945 Constitution.

However, 18 years later, struggling for the same principle, he was shot dead. The authorities knew him pretty well. It is unthinkable that there was no other method that could be used to convince him apart from using the gun.

I, Zuchra I. Biki, have vowed to continue the struggle waged by my son, Haji Amir Biki, so that the Indonesian people in general and Muslims in particular would be liberated from both the physical and mental injustice of the present regime. This state should really be founded on Pancasila. Members of the government should be those who could convince us by experiencing Pancasila and putting it into practice earnestly.

In the name of Allah the Beneficent and the Merciful, let us carry on our struggle sincerely, more wisely, and more intensively. May Allah the Almighty bless our struggle. Wassalamu'alaikum wa rahmatullah wa barakatuhu.

Hajjah Zuchra I. Biki
Jakarta, 15 September 1984

Published in *Impact International*
(London), 26 October-8 November 1984.

Many Muslims charged with subversion

The courts in Jakarta have begun to hear a number of trials in which the defendants are all Muslim political prisoners. The trials are part of a major campaign by the government to stamp out the political unrest and opposition that reached a climax in the second half of 1984. The unrest has taken a variety of forms: out-spoken sermons and lectures in the mosques, dissemination of anti-government leaflets and acts of arson and bombings following the Tanjung Priok massacre in September 1984 when at least 63 were shot dead by troops. Needless to say, those responsible for the massacre are not being called to account, let alone tried.

The unrest has been prompted by dissatisfaction among Muslims as the military government presses ahead with its intention to compel all parties and social organisations to accept the state ideology called Pancasila as their sole principle.

The trials already under way or due to start soon can be divided into several groups:

- ★ Defendants accused of involvement in the bombing on 4 October 1984 of two branch offices of the Bank Central Asia, the property of General Suharto's close associate, the business magnate, Liem Sioe Liong,
- ★ Defendants accused of producing, reproducing and/or disseminating illegal pamphlets which are critical of the government or which challenge General Benny Murdani's version of what happened in Tanjung Priok last September;
- ★ Defendants accused of being "extremist lecturers" (*penceramah ekstrim*) who are in fact lay-preachers known as *mubaligh*. Some of these "extremist lecturers" on trial spoke at the meeting in Tanjung Priok on 12 September which preceded the mass demonstration to the army and police headquarters that ended in the massacre;
- ★ Defendants accused of harassing and intimidating the army officer who came to the prayerhouse in Tanjung Priok and ordered the removal of notices from the walls.

All those being tried except the last group are being charged under the Anti-Subversion Law of 1963 which enables courts to bring sentences of anything up to death. This Law, used repeatedly by the regime since 1965 against political opponents of many political hues, is renowned for its vagueness of definition on what constitutes an act of subversion.

Many defence lawyers mobilised to help

Several dozen lawyers have made themselves available to assist the Muslim defendants, each of whom is being provided by a team of three or four lawyers. So far, the press reports of trials have consisted almost entirely of accounts of the prosecution

case; it remains to be seen whether the defence will be reported as fully.

A team of lawyers called "Team to Defend the Mubaligh/Political Cases" has been set up with members from three legal aid groups, the Jakarta and national Legal Aid Institutes (LBH and YLBHI), the Legal Aid Advisers to Mubalighs, and the League for the Defence of Basic Human Rights. Mr T. Mulya Lubis, chairman of the YLBHI who is chairing and co-ordinating the Mubaligh/Political Cases Team, said recently that it had been asked to handle 19 subversion cases so far.


A. A. G. Ngurah, head of Public Relations of the Attorney-General's Office, told journalists during an official briefing in November that the charges in most of the cases would be based on the Anti-Subversion Law and went on:

The detentions and arrests that have taken place are not directed against the opposition because there is no such thing as an opposition in our democracy. It's only under liberal democracy that such a thing exists. This means that those who are now under arrest are people who have committed crimes. (*Sinar Harapan*, 21 November 1984.)


Mulya Lubis does not agree. In his own briefing with the press at which he announced the creation of the Mubaligh/Political Cases Defence Team, he was asked whether there was such a thing as political trials in Indonesia, to which he replied: "Then what is subversion if it isn't political?" (*Sinar Harapan*, 22 November.)

The Assa'ad Mushollah trial

The Tanjung Priok massacre was sparked off by provocative actions of a local military officer known as the *babinsa* who entered the Assa'ad *musholla* (prayer-house) and ordered notices announcing lectures to be removed from the walls. But justice has been turned on its head; the *babinsa* who caused the trouble is appearing not as the accused but as the chief prosecution witness against the people he offended and angered.



Victims in the dock: From left to right: M. Nur, Syarifuddin Rambe, Syafwan Sulaiman and Achmad Sahi.



The Assa'ad Mushollah, Tanjung Priok.

Trials Trials Trials Trials Trials Trials

The four on trial are **Syarifuddin Rambe**, 39, a watch repairer, **Achmad Sahi**, 35, a cargo supervisor at Bulog, the logistics agency, **Syafwan Sulaiman**, 33, a worker, and **Muhamad Nur bin Amat**, 22. The first three are alleged to have spread "false information" and are charged with inciting to riot and causing a public disturbance. The charges carry a sentence of up to 10 years. The "false information" concerned Sergeant Herman who entered their *musholla* without removing his shoes; he then smeared notices on the walls with gutter-water after trying unsuccessfully to remove them with his bare hands. The incident was witnessed by three others, all of whom are said to be in hiding, but the three accused, when told about it, "without checking whether it was true", spread the report to people around, causing anger and consternation".

In his evidence, Sergeant Hermanu told the court he *had* used gutter water to remove the notices because they were so firmly stuck on. But press reports about whether he said he was wearing his boots vary. The **Jakarta Post** (11 January) has him saying that he did not remove them, while **Sinar Harapan** (11 January) heard him say he did. The **Post** also reports that the court frequently warned the Sergeant "for his bad attitude in court". When asked if he had obtained permission from the neighbourhood authorities to remove the notices, he replied: "I am a soldier. They are my subordinates".

If that's his attitude towards officials, it's not difficult to imagine how he behaved towards ordinary members of the public.

Syarifuddin Rambe and Syafwan Sulaiman are also accused of "forcing" Sergeant Hermanu and another soldier to go to the neighbourhood security post to answer for their behaviour and apologise to the assembled crowd, some of whom pelted the soldiers with stones and sand. It was when other troops arrived on the scene to "rescue" Hermanu and his colleague, that the men were arrested.

The defence lawyers have been prevented from asking a number of "suggestive" questions in court and reminded by the presiding judge that this is "an ordinary criminal case" which has nothing to do with religion, mubalighs or mushollas.

The fourth man on trial is accused of having "pushed, hit, overturned and burned" Sergeant Hermanu's motorbike.

A complaint by the defence about irregularities in the way the men were detained was dismissed by the court. Although press reports do not explain, the complaint must have concerned the fact that the arrests were made by the army, not the police, which is the only authority entitled to make arrests under the Procedural Code (KUHAP).

The BCA bombing trial

The first to appear for trial in connection with the bombs exploded at two branches of Bank Central Asia and a shop is **Rachmat Basuki**, who is accused of master-minding the operation. The accused is not a newcomer to the subversion courts. He was tried and sentenced to two years for his part in the so-called 20 March 1978 affair when a group of Muslim activists staged a demonstration in a hotel where members of the upper chamber (MPR) were staying, just before the MPR met, elected General Suharto uncontested for a third term as president and decided on an elaborate programme of Pancasila indoctrination. Four others are to be tried for the bombings. One is **Ir M. Sanusi** former government minister whose trial is now under way. The others are **Tasrif Tuaskal**, **Eddy Ramli**, **Melta Halim alias Yunus**, and **Jayadi** (sometimes spelt **Zayadi**).

According to the prosecution, the accused met Tasrif four days after the Tanjung Priok massacre to discuss an idea to bomb Pertamina and PLN (electricity) installations. The accused disagreed because the targets are vital to the public and suggested instead the BCA central office, as a "symbol of Chinese domination". (BCA's leading share-holder, Liem Sioe

Liong, is a close business associate of General Suharto.) In the event, the head office was not targetted because it was too heavily guarded. The plan was further discussed at a meeting on 18 September attended by A.M. Fatwa and Major-General (ret.) H.R. Dharsono both of whom are due to be tried as well. The accused stressed the need to avoid casualties by giving advance notice of the bomb attacks and was later disconcerted that two people in fact died and another person was wounded. He was also unhappy at the amateurish performance; one of the persons who placed a bomb made a mistake fixing the timer and injured himself.

Rachmat's defence team consists of Yap Thiam Hien of the LBH, H.C. Princen of the Human Rights League and H. Dault of the Mubaligh Legal Advisors Team. Commenting to a **Tempo** journalist after the first hearing at which the indictment was read, Rachmat Basuki said the prosecution was 99% correct, but "the 1% from me can finish off all the rest". He asked the court for a typewriter so that he could write up his version of what happened (**Tempo**, 12 January 1985).

Nalapraja in Attendance

Security control of people wishing to attend the hearing was very tight, and metal detectors were used. Among those attending was Brigadier-General Eddy Nalapraja, former intelligence chief of the Jakarta Military Command, now Deputy Governor of the Jakarta Municipality, whose name has been closely linked to the Tanjung Priok massacre. He is known to have been acquainted for many years with one of the victims of the massacre, Amir Biki, who urged the people attending the meeting on 12 September to march on the police and army offices. Nalapraja, according to some sources, a close friend of Murdani's, is believed to have helped fan the flames at the time, possibly with the purpose of embarrassing the present Jakarta commander, Major-General Tri Soetrisno who, unlike most senior army officers, is a devout Muslim. Nalapraja's (and Murdani's) plans however went awry because protest after Tanjung Priok got out of hand, compelling Murdani himself to rush round the country placating Muslim communities.

The Illegal Pamphlets Trial

The leaflets trial comes after a period when illegal pamphlets have been widely circulating in many parts of Indonesia. The Jogjakarta Military Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Tuswandi has complained that no fewer than 15 types of leaflets are circulating in his area of command, by comparison with three to five circulating in other major cities. The leaflets were mostly sent through the post and were addressed to local military police offices as well as to youth groups in the city and surrounding villages. In Sukabumi District, West Java, a huge pile of neatly wrapped, offset-printed illegal leaflets weighing no less than a ton, was discovered down a disused well when army troops carried out a raid on Cibenda Village. Later the actual weight of the leaflets was challenged by the West Java military authorities saying it was "only" several quintals (a quintal equals 100 kilograms).

The trial scheduled to begin in Jakarta has three defendants, identified in the press only by their initials. They are S.H. bin K. (24 years old), A.S. bin K. (20 years) and R.Z.L. (22 years). S.H. bin K. is described as a trader; the other two are school-students. They are accused of handing round a leaflet "inciting ill feelings in the community" and "contradicting the official explanation by General Benny Murdani of the events in Tanjung Priok". A.S. bin K. is accused of having received two copies of this dangerous leaflet, whereupon he made 20 copies and gave them to people at a prayer-house (*mushollah*) in Tanah Abang, Jakarta. S.H. bin K. the one said to have produced the two leaflets, even went so far as to urge others to "go on strike". As for R.Z.L. he didn't give the leaflets away but *sold* them to people at the Arief Rachman Hakim Mosque in Central Jakarta.

Former Minister on trial

Ir. H. Muhamad Sanusi, 63, Industries Minister in Suharto's first cabinet from 1966 to 1968 and later an elected member of Parliament (1971-77) is also on trial, accused of providing the funds for the 4 October bombing incident. Sanusi was one of the signatories of the White Paper (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No.66, November 1984) which gave an independent account of the events leading up to the Tanjung Priok massacre. Sanusi is from the modernist Muslim social organisation Muhammadiyah.

The accused is charged under the Anti-Subversion Law. He has denied all the charges and declared that he knows none of the people standing trial in connection with the bombings except for Rachmat Basuki.

"Extremist Lecturer" Trials

The *mubalighs* who are due to come up for trial as "extremist lecturers" include A.M. Fatwa, secretary of Ali Sadikin and a frequent victim of army persecution and detention, Tony Ardie who was arrested and tried in 1983 for an "inflammatory" mosque speech which touched on the sensitive issue of headscarves for Muslim girls at school, and Abdul Qadir Jaelani who, like Rachmat Basuki, was tried and sentenced in connection with the 20 March 1978 affair. The two latter plus Mawardi Nur, chairman of the Indonesian Mubalighs Corps are to be tried for their speeches at the 12 September meeting in Tanjung Priok.

Another "extremist lecturer" now under arrest and awaiting trial is Professor H. Usman al Hamidy, Rector of the Islamic Dakwah (Missionary) College, PTDI. No doubt these "extremist lecturers" will have a good chance to air their views in court, which could make interesting reading in the press or later, if published illegally as student defendants in 1978 published their defence speeches.

Acehnese Commander gets life

Muhammad Idris, a leading member of the Free Aceh Movement (National Liberation Movement of Aceh-Sumatra), has been sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of subversion. The trial was conducted by the Langsa District Court.

Tempo (24 November 1984), reporting the verdict, wrote that

Death Sentence

Muslim Prisoner could be executed soon . . .

A Muslim political prisoner, Salman Hafidz, who was sentenced to death for his part in an attack on a police station in Cicendo, West Java is to face the firing squad soon, according to a spokesman of the High Court in Bandung West Java. The incident, which occurred in March 1981, resulted in the death of three policemen. It occurred just shortly before a Garuda plane was hijacked to Bangkok Airport. During the trial of another prisoner held responsible for the hijack, the defence lawyers presented evidence in court that army intelligence had infiltrated the group.

Besides being accused of involvement in the attack on the police station, Salman Hafidz was accused of undermining state authority and attempting to replace the Pancasila state with an Islamic state. These are the charges that presumably earned him the death sentence; homicide does not carry the death sentence under Indonesian law, whereas subversion does.

The convicted man took his appeal up to the highest level, but on 5 January, President Suharto rejected his request for clemency. A report in *Sinar Harapan* (21

Idris "passionately upheld his support for an independent Aceh" during his defence plea and insisted on describing himself as a citizen of the state of Aceh, a commander now being tried by a foreign state.

The sentence passed by the Court was far in excess of the prosecutor's request for 12 years. Nor did the judges bother to complete the usual procedure of hearing a second round of prosecution and defence statements after the defendant's first plea. Instead, without even adjourning the hearing, the Court announced its verdict and sentence only half an hour after Idris had read out his 18-page defence plea.

The announcement of the verdict brought an emotional response from the several thousand people following the proceedings inside and outside the courtroom. Many people outside pushed hard to get into the courtroom, "hysterically yelling slogans in support of the defendant", reported **Tempo**. Scuffles broke out with the security forces who, according to **Tempo**, were expecting such a violent response. It was only with great difficulty that they managed to get their prisoner away from the scene "and fled with him, straight back to the prison".

The crowd had been able to follow everything through a loudspeaker relaying proceedings to the street outside. The loudspeaker had been installed after Idris demanded at the first hearing that the trial should be held in public, and refused to participate in further hearings unless a loudspeaker was installed.

The defendant is a graduate of the Medan Agricultural Academy and was employed by PT Asamera Oil Company, a sub-contractor for Pertamina. He joined the Free Aceh Movement founded by Teugku Hasan di Tiro in 1976, and became a regional commander for the Peureulak Region a year later. He is alleged to have seized a small quantity of arms from Indonesian troops, and wrote a manual on "The Strategy and Tactics of Guerrilla Warfare". When he was arrested in May 1982, he was said to be carrying a gun and 60 bullets.

Two Acehnese Fighters Given 2½ years

In a series of trials now under way of Acehnese liberation fighters, two others, Umar Ahmad and Harun Ali were sentenced to 2½ years each by the District Court in Sigli. Umar Ahmad is said to have escorted Dr Zaini and Dr Husaini, two Free Aceh Movement leaders, when they escaped to Malaysia several years ago. He was captured on that occasion but managed to escape and was not re-arrested until 1984.

January) said arrangements for the execution were under way, but denied rumours circulating that Salman Hafidz had already been shot.

. . . but two others saved

The Dutch Foreign Minister announced in Parliament on 20 November last that the Dutch Government has been given an assurance by the Indonesian Government that the death sentences against Gatot Lestario (Sutaryo) and Djoko Untung will not be carried out even though their requests for clemency have been rejected by the President. (See **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 66, November 1984)

The assurance follows a similar assurance given to the Dutch Government in May 1980 that political prisoners under sentence of death would not be executed. The frame of reference at that time was the many 1965 prisoners who had been given death sentences. The assurance given last November was in response to a question raised in the Dutch Parliament about Djoko Untung and Gatot Lestario. The Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van den Broek also said in his reply that the Dutch Government will continue to pay attention to the matter.

Five foreign journalists expelled

Five foreign journalists have been obliged to give up their assignments in Indonesia in the past 12 months because the government took strong objection to stories they filed. All of them represented leading news agencies or dailies. Earlier, the government had directed its exclusion orders mainly against Australian journalists and the occasional "troublesome" Dutch journalist.

None of the journalists removed in the latest expulsions could be described as strongly critical of the military regime; indeed, most have been generally sympathetic. Their only "crime" is that they tried to probe a little deeper into political developments, going beyond official explanations.

The first to be told to leave was Elizabeth Reckweg of UPI who upset the government because she published figures about Indonesian troop deployment in East Timor. (Unfortunately, TAPOL was not aware of her report at the time.) Then followed Gilles Bertin, writing for *Agence France Press* who was apparently told to leave because of a report about the Petition-of-50 group and its leader, Ali Sadikin. (We did not see this report either, though we did receive and use a number of his reports about conditions and the state of fighting in East Timor which could hardly have pleased the government.)

Next to go was Joseph Manguno, correspondent of the *Asian Wall Street Journal* though as far as we know, no specific reason was given for his expulsion. Not long after, Susumu Awanohara, regularly writing for the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, was told to leave. Apparently he fell foul of the regime on many issues: his reports about the death-squads, about the policy clash between Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja and Armed Forces Commander General Benny Murdani on the question of Vietnam, and the recent arrest of dissidents in Jakarta.

Early in December, Japan's leading daily, *Asahi Shimbun*, lost its correspondent in Jakarta. But unlike the four others who had been expelled "more politely" by not having their visas renewed, Akira Mori was ordered to leave within a week. According to an Information Department spokesperson, Mori had filed a report about the Armed Forces which contained "an error" as he quoted illegal leaflets considered to be subversive. There must have been a disagreement in official circles on how to deal with Mori. He told AFP that initially, he had been told that the government regarded his report as "insulting" but his visa was nevertheless renewed. Then suddenly he was summoned to the Information Department and told to leave.

The expulsion of foreign journalists is intended as a warning

to their papers or agencies. Whereas virtually all Australian news media are prohibited from any representation in Indonesia, other media have not been prevented from sending new correspondents in place of those thrown out. Murdani

Murdani is "jittery" about journalists

Asked recently by *Reuters* correspondent in Jakarta, Peter Millership, why foreign correspondents who have applied for permission to visit East Timor have been turned down, Murdani bluntly replied: "We are jittery with journalists." That sentiment is clearly not confined to East Timor affairs.

apparently feels satisfied with his efforts to muzzle the foreign press for he said, after addressing a meeting of the Indonesian Press Council (*Indonesian Reports*, December Log, page 17), that foreign reporting on Indonesia was now running parallel with the main lines of government policy. But he is at the same time having to muzzle his own bureaucrats. Australian *Financial Review* (14 November) reports that some government ministries have been warned by army security to avoid any contact with the foreign press.

Private radios told: government news bulletins only

Private radio stations scattered throughout the country are known to have a huge audience and have for years been required to devote 40% of their broadcast time to government-originated material. But in December, control on newscasting was tightened up when private stations were barred from broadcasting any news bulletins of their own and relay only news bulletins from *Radio Republik Indonesia* (RRI). As it is, according to the Jakarta branch of the Indonesian Private Radio Broadcasters Association (PRSSNI), they rely on official sources such as the *Antara* news agency, handouts from the Defence Department, provincial governors' offices, regional military commands and the police for compilation of their own news bulletins. The PRSSNI has urged the Information Minister to reconsider his latest restriction, saying that they could get this news out to their listeners much faster than RRI, and had proven this most recently with their reporting of the Tanjung Priok incident and the explosion at the Cilandak ammunition dump.

Police intimidate journalists in North Sumatra

Three journalists were arrested, three others fled for safety to Medan and one other went into hiding in the district of Padang Sidempuan, North Sumatra because the district police chief (*kapolres*) objected to media reporting of a pre-trial hearing in which police officers were being accused of unlawful arrest.

The three arrested journalists were Jhonatan Siregar of *Dobrak*, Ali Rahman Nasution of *Mercu Suar* and Jaliluli

Harahap of *Mimbar Umum*. The three who fled to report the arrests to the Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI) Medan branch and seek the protection of the Medan Legal Aid Institute (LBH) declared that they would not return home until they had assurances from the police that they would not be arrested. The journalist who went into hiding did so after receiving an intimidatory letter from the District Police Chief warning of "firm measures" if a police order for the pre-trial hearing not to be reported in the press was ignored.

The reason for the police chief's fury was that journalists had reported a pre-trial hearing in which the police were the accused. The police had ordered the journalists not to take photographs of their members on trial, but the journalists stuck by their right to publish photos as long as they had the permission of the presiding judge, which had indeed been granted.

The arrest warrant for the three arrested journalists accused them of "creating ill-feeling" in the community, and linked this charge with their reports of the pre-trial hearing. Later,



however, when the case was given wide publicity not only in the media in North Sumatra but also in the national press, the district police issued new warrants claiming that they had formal criminal charges against the journalists.

Sinar Harapan, which has given extensive coverage to this case, reported on 21 December that a number of journalists went to Padang Sidempuan to visit their detained colleagues. They confirmed that the arrests were an act of vengeance and had nothing to do with any criminal offence. The police chief responsible, Ansyar Roem, was quoted in the Medan press as saying:

I've been under attack for more than two months with reports about the pre-trial hearings. Do journalists think they're a bunch of angels immune from the processes of the law? If they think they can be clever digging around for my mistakes and weaknesses, I'll show them I can be even cleverer, as they will soon find out.

Sinar Harapan said Ansyar Roem had delivered these words


with a great deal of emotion and added that, after months of being subjected to attacks from these journalists, it was now his turn to impose his authority, and he would not hesitate to do so as long as he wielded the necessary power.

Journalists released

Following the widespread publicity, the Police Chief of North Sumatra ordered Ansyar Roem to release the three men and place them under external detention (*tahanan luar*). The three who fled to Medan have also returned home. Even so, a fact-finding mission set up by the PWI and LBH in North Sumatra decided to proceed with their investigations. One lawyer who has been following the case said this was a prime example of the abuse of power and the blinkered view of many officials about the role of the press.

Source: **Sinar Harapan**, 17, 18, 21 and 26 December, and 3 January 1985.

Ali Sadikin challenges Murdani to a debate



Lieutenant-General (retired) Ali Sadikin.

Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, General Benny Murdani used the occasion of a retirement banquet for 22 high-ranking officers on 30 October to make a blistering attack on retired senior officers who have publicly criticised the present military regime. The men he had in mind included General (ret.) Nasution, former Defence Minister and Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Ali Sadikin, formerly commander of the Marine Corps (KKO) and Major-General (ret.) H.R. Dharsono, now under arrest, formerly Chief-of-Staff of the Siliwangi division, plus many others who have recently put their signatures to various critical documents now widely circulating inside Indonesia.

Murdani described their criticisms as "unhealthy" and "unconstructive" and a betrayal of the results of the struggle pioneered "by our predecessors". He warned the officers now going into retirement that as fighters and soldiers (*pejuang prajurit*) their struggle "must continue to the end of time".

A quick response came from Ali Sadikin in an open letter, which has not the slightest chance of appearing in any publication inside Indonesia, challenging Murdani to a public debate. Ali Sadikin's response reads as follows:

- 1) You are perfectly entitled to present your own assessment of some Armed Forces officers now in retirement.
- 2) Likewise, we are entitled to declare that what we have done is intended to improve the image of the Armed Forces in the eyes of the public, in upholding justice in the Indonesian Republic as a state based on law with sovereignty in the hands of the people.
- 3) I should add that there certainly are differences of opinion between Armed Forces officers who are still active in government and some now in retirement concerning the general implementation of government and, more specifically, the role of the Armed Forces within the state.
- 4) I believe that there is nothing catastrophic about differences of opinion. Such differences can even be a blessing if we express them constitutionally through formal and informal channels, resulting in well-directed and effective communication.
- 5) The fact that these differences exist is widely known in society. Therefore, to ensure that they indeed become a blessing, I propose a nation-wide exchange of opinions between leading Armed Forces officers still active in government and those retired Armed Forces who hold different opinions.
- 6) Such an exchange of opinions should be open and heart-to-heart, and the best place would be at the Parliament Building or, in keeping with modern technology, on television.
- 7) If we conduct this exchange of views as befits a mature nation which upholds national discipline, I feel convinced that the people will greatly benefit.



General Benny Murdani.

Death-squads active again

Organised army death-squads have become active again after a respite of several months. Six bodies were discovered in various parts of Jogjakarta, Central Java during December, all of them members of a well-known youth gang in the city. *Tempo* weekly, quoted in *Volkskrant* (18 January 1985), reported that the deaths were known to be the result of a new sweep against criminals. The journal quoted the military commander of Jogjakarta, Colonel Tuswandi as saying that the authorities were again launching a "security action" against hardened criminals. "We are taking no risks with these criminals who continue to cause trouble and are always trying to escape."

The army's death-squad drive against criminals in 1983 and 1984 commenced in Jogjakarta as well; the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta estimated that about four thousand people were shot dead or murdered in other ways up to the end of 1984.

The new campaign comes only weeks after General Murdani told *Reuters* on 17 December that the Armed Forces had never given orders for criminals to be killed and denied that the many deaths of criminals since March 1983 were the result of an organised campaign. He did say however, that when he took over as commander of the armed Forces in March 1983, he found that the police were not doing a proper job in many areas:

"So what we did—what I did, OK, I said it—I said: 'Be more firm. It is part of your job to protect this man. You protect him even if you have to pull the trigger.'" His explanation according to *Reuters*, was that this had resulted in Mafia-style gangs being driven out of their areas of influence into the territory of other gangs, sparking bloody gangland warfare. (*Guardian*, 18 December, 1984) Murdani apparently forgot to brief his subordinate in Jogja about what he told *Reuters*, so as to keep their stories consistent with each other.

ASEAN Labour Ministers worried about "interference"

Indonesia's Minister of Labour, Admiral Sudomo, who was Commander of the security agency KOPKAMTIB, until early 1983, intends to do everything possible to prevent international solidarity actions in support of Indonesian workers by international trade union organisations, which he regards as gross interference in Indonesia's internal affairs.

His remarks came after a meeting of ASEAN Labour Ministers held in Manila on 8–9 October where the ministers had apparently compared notes about such "interference". He gave as one example the ILO's condemnation of Indonesia in the 1970s for using political detainees as forced labour on the island of Buru. In Sudomo's eyes, the prison island where well over 10,000 untried political prisoners were held for nearly a decade, working in arduous and extremely hazardous conditions without pay, was a "rehabilitation centre" preparing the prisoners for their return to society.

Another solidarity campaign which had alarmed the ASEAN ministers, he said, was the Australian trade union boycott of MAS planes when pilots of the Malaysian airline were on strike in the late 1970s. "Indonesia almost encountered the same problem when (Garuda) pilots were making moves to join their international trade union." (Presumably, this was at the time Garuda pilots were on strike, not long after the MAS strike.) "But we prevented that", said Sudomo. "I was KOPKAMTIB Commander at the time."

He said that data compiled by the ASEAN ministers would be submitted to the 10th meeting of Asian and Pacific Labour Ministers due to take place in Australia in January 1985.

Finally on the right to strike in Indonesia, Sudomo claimed the right was recognised, though quickly added that since the

right has not yet been regulated by law (in fact it has), people should not think they can go ahead and exercise it. And what of these regulations when they come into force? Said Sudomo: "We're promoting a *gotong-royong* life-style, based on consensus. Strikes have no part in this framework because they are acts of violence."

(Source: *Merdeka*, 15 October 1984)

Dutch musicians abandon tour in protest

The members of the internationally-renowned Netherlands Wind Ensemble cut short a tour of Indonesian cities last October in protest against the political overtones of the tour programme.

After a meeting with the Dutch ambassador in Jakarta, the Ensemble decided not to go ahead with a concert they were to have given in Bandung, and it was cancelled. The place chosen was a hall at a military academy, probably the Staff and Command School (SESKOAD), and most of the audience would have consisted of invitees from the Armed Forces.

After an earlier concert in Jakarta, the musicians registered their protest at the political framework in which the concert had been set. Without prior consultation with the Ensemble, the Dutch Ambassador decided to link the concert with an official visit being made to Indonesia by a Dutch government minister. Initially, the musicians announced that they would not play but after discussion, decided to go ahead with the programme. When the announced programme was completed, the oboist, Werner Herbers, introduced an encore with the following words:

"We dedicate this piece to everyone and especially to all the artists—those who are free as well as those who aren't—in this beautiful country of Indonesia."

Source: *Volkskrant*, 22 October 1984

Societies' Law: Foreign Office reply

In TAPOL Bulletin No.66, we published the correspondence between the Foreign Office and Lord Avebury, Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, regarding the new Societies Law now before the Indonesian Parliament.

Richard Luce, Minister of State, sent the following reply to Lord Avebury on 23 November 1984.

I have given careful consideration to your letters on this subject. Clearly, questions about the significance of the proposed legislation, the nature of the opposition to the Bills in Indonesia and the reasons behind the riots in Jakarta in September are matters of judgement on which different assessments are possible. I am, however, sure you would agree that it would be wrong for us to take issue with the proposed Bills which are the domestic legislation put forward by another country and, moreover, still at only the draft stage. Such action on our part could be interpreted as unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

That said, we are, as the record shows, willing to speak out against established cases of human rights abuse. We are well aware of the concern to which the Bills have given rise amongst certain groups both inside Indonesia and elsewhere and on this occasion I have asked our Ambassador discreetly to make known to the Indonesian authorities the concern which you, in your capacity as Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, have expressed to me. We shall continue to follow developments closely.

Lawyers barred from leaving Indonesia

At least three human rights lawyers, all of them members of the Mubaligh/Political Cases Defence Team, have been barred from going abroad. They are T. Mulya Lubis, chairman of the YLBHI and of the Defence Team, H.C. Princen, chairman of the Human Rights Institute and Abdul Hakim, chairman of the Jakarta LBH. Mulya Lubis told AAP that the authorities had refused to grant exit permits, without giving any reason.

Indonesia's upside-down land reform

The Minister for Agriculture, Ir Achmad Affandi, announced a plan in August last year to cut by half the number of peasants cultivating land of less than 0.5 hectares, and to work for the eventual elimination of all small-sized farms. The programme would be implemented, he said, "without compensation". The dispossessed farmers can transmigrate, move onto nucleus estates, join other government-sponsored programmes, amalgamate their plots, or whatever. "But in the end", he stressed, "farms of less than half a hectare must disappear; also those of less than a hectare." (*Kompas*, 20 August 1984.)

In assessing the implications of this newly-announced policy, we may first note that it represents a reversal of the land reform policies enacted in 1960, which still remain on the books even if never implemented, as a courageous editorial in the daily newspaper *Merdeka* reminds us:

The abolition of farms—however small—means the abolition of land ownership rights. According to our Basic Agrarian Laws, landless peasants and those whose land is too small must be given more land . . . and according to the same laws, those who own land in excess of what the law defines as appropriate must have part of their land taken away. Now, exactly the opposite is to happen: large landowners are to be left untouched, and those who own too little are to be done away with and dispossessed. Is this just and progressive (*adil dan maju*)? (*Merdeka*, 23/8/84)

This idea of an "upside-down" land reform — in which land is taken away from the smallest peasants to create and strengthen a class of "middle" peasants — is in fact not absolutely new in Indonesian history. A similar policy was invented and implemented by the colonial government in the district of East Cirebon (Java) in the 1920s; about one-fifth of the peasants holding shares in communal land in that district were dismissed without compensation and their land distributed among the others (those interested in these colonial reforms and their disastrous results may read the recent study by Professor Berman, 1983).

Secondly, for those not well-acquainted with agrarian conditions in Indonesia, we may note that the policies outlined by Minister Affandi, if implemented, would not affect only a small minority of Indonesia's peasants but a rather large majority: at the time of the 1980 Population Census (see Table 1 below) farms of less than 0.5 hectare represented almost two-thirds of all farms in Indonesia, and almost three-quarters of all farms in Java.

Certainly, the existence of so many millions of tiny farms represents an enormous problem, particularly in Java where more than 60% of Indonesia's population of about 150 million live on about 7% of Indonesia's land area, with average population densities of about 700 people per square kilometer which make it the most densely-populated agrarian region in the world.

TABLE 1:
Distribution of farm sizes among rural households,
according to the 1980 Population Census

Farm size	Number (in millions) and percent of households:					
	JAVA		OTHER ISLANDS		TOTAL	
	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	No.	(%)
Less than 0.25 ha.	4.43	(43%)	1.53	(21%)	5.96	(34%)
0.25–0.50 ha.	3.10	(30%)	1.96	(28%)	5.06	(29%)
More than 0.50 ha.	2.83	(27%)	3.61	(51%)	6.44	(37%)
Total "farm" households	10.36	(100%)	7.10	(100%)	17.46	(100%)
Number of "agricultural wage labour households"	6.02		1.21		7.23	
Number of rural households	15.19		8.91		24.10	

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, *Penduduk Indonesia Menurut Propinsi* (Seri L no 3), 1981, Table 14 (farm sizes), Table 17 (agricultural wage labour households); *Penduduk Indonesia* (Seri S no 2), 1983, Table 60.2 (number of rural households).

The "problem" of small farmers is *not* a problem of inefficiency in maximising the production of food or other agricultural products on a limited land area. In Indonesia as in many other third-world countries, it is the smallest farmers — despite all their problems of lack of access to BIMAS credit and other services — who manage to achieve the highest per-hectare yields, as the data in Table 2 demonstrate.

However, most of those commenting on Minister Affandi's plans have agreed that in general, farms of less than 0.5 ha. cannot provide the peasant household with a reasonable income. Professors I Bagus Teken and Guswono Supardi of Bogor Agricultural University commented that for a peasant with less than 0.5 ha. of irrigated land or 0.75 ha. of rainfed land,

"no matter what he does, his efforts on the farm cannot provide a reasonable standard of living. His income can increase, but it still can't support him", apart from exceptional cases like an orchid farm, "but how many farmers have the chance to cultivate a high-value commodity like that?" (*Kompas*, 28/8/84). M. Toha, chairman of the All-Indonesia Farmers' Association (HKTI) was only slightly more optimistic: farms of less than 0.5 ha. can be made more "effective" through rapid transfer of technology, but that requires a large investment which may not be feasible in Indonesia at present (*Merdeka*, 24/8/84).

Some small farmers, in fact, have been able to achieve this kind of dramatic technical progress. The Australian researchers W. and S. Edmundson,

TABLE 2:
Yield of padi sawah* according to area of *sawah holding (1975)

Size of sawah holding	Padi yield (tons per harvested hectare)	
	JAVA	ALL INDONESIA
Less than 0.25 ha.	4.4	4.3
0.25–0.49 ha.	4.1	3.9
0.50–0.74 ha.	4.0	3.8
0.75–1.49 ha.	3.9	3.5
1.50–2.99 ha.	3.7	3.3
More than 3.00 ha.	3.6	3.3
Average	4.0	3.7

Source: Data from Biro Pusat Statistik, calculated by Keuning (1984, p.61)
*sawah: riceland

revisiting a village in East Java which had been the site of a previous study, give the example of half-hectare rice farms which in 1965 produced two crops per year and a total of 3.6 tons, while in 1983 three crops per year gave a total of 9.6 tons, "enough to feed six families at subsistence level" (Edmundson & Edmundson, 1983). More important, however, is that the production of a farm of 0.5 ha.—even of 0.2 or 0.1 ha.—can provide a crucial part of a reasonable household income when combined with other activities. As many detailed village-level studies have shown during the 1970s, it is just this pattern of multiple income sources which provides the key to the survival of so many millions of tiny farms in Java. To estimate the minimum size of a "viable" farm, we should not only calculate what the land itself produces but add to that the income from chickens or ducks (and their eggs), a few sheep or goats and perhaps a cow or buffalo; the produce of the tiny but intensively-cultivated house-gardens (*pekarangan*); and the income from the many other activities of men, women and children, which may include handicrafts, part-time petty trading, and agricultural or non-agricultural wage-labour, which may involve the seasonal or "circular" out-migration of one or more family members to Jakarta or another city. In short: *nearly all of Java's "farmers" are already "part-time" farmers*. While this may not be a very "neat" state of affairs from the planners' point of view — for example, it makes conventional labour-force statistics on employment by sector, which record only one "occupation" per person, almost meaningless — it is an important part of the reality of Indonesian small-peasant survival strategies.



Millions of women work in agriculture.

dismal, with the great proportion of non-agricultural workforce having to seek employment in the already overcrowded "trade" and "services" sectors, both of which are characterised by very low incomes (Table 3).

What of the future? Population and labour-force projections made by the Central Bureau of Statistics and the World

increase in the labour force, to say nothing of those millions of small-farm households whom Minister Affandi hopes to "encourage" to abandon their land by 1989. As two recent analysts have noted:

Labour-intensification in manufacturing, the most often mentioned solution, could not possibly be sufficient by itself in one plan period if only because the manufacturing sector is still so small, representing only 8.4% of the labour force in 1980. Thus agriculture and services must continue to bear the largest share of the labour absorption burden, which implies that they must become even more labour-intensive or grow more rapidly. (Glassburner & Poffenberger, 1983, p.6)

Thus, in the foreseeable future, planners should not be thinking of solving the small-farmer "problem" by throwing millions of households off their land into sectors which cannot absorb them, but rather of throwing more state resources in the direction of the small farmers, to assist and strengthen their efforts to intensify small-scale production and labour-use, both on and off the farm. As M. Toha of the HKTI (see above) comments: "With no existing means of accommodating the labour force affected by this (planned) abolition of small farms, it will only create a new and difficult problem, that of increasing unemployment" (*Merdeka*, 24/8/84).

Perhaps the only element in Minister Affandi's plan which might be positively received is the idea of encouraging holders of small farm plots to amalgamate their tiny holdings and cultivate them jointly, with shared resources of land, labour and

Continued on page 18

TABLE 3:
Percentage of employed persons by industry, Indonesia 1971-1980

Industry	1971 (%)	1980 (%)
1. Agriculture	64.2	54.8
2. Mining & quarrying	0.2	0.7
3. Manufacturing industry	6.5	8.5
4. Electricity, Gas & Water	0.1	0.2
5. Construction	1.6	3.1
6. Trade	10.3	12.9
7. Transport & communication	2.3	2.9
8. Finance	0.2	0.4
9. Services	10.0	15.1
(Other/unstated)	(4.6)	(1.4)
Total	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik, *A Brief Note on 1980 Population Census*, Jakarta, 1982 p.47

Manufacturing does not help absorb labour from the villages

In Indonesia according to census statistics, some shift of the labour-force out of agriculture has been occurring during the 1970s. However, the slow growth of manufacturing industry and its predominantly capital-intensive pattern of new investment have meant that the labour-absorption record of this sector is

Bank agree that Indonesia's population will grow from 148 million in 1980 to about 233 million in 2000; labour-force growth of 2.5% per year is predicted until at least 1990, which means for example that *about 1.5 million extra people each year will be looking for work* in the current (1984-1989) Five Year Plan. Under these circumstances, we may doubt whether non-agricultural sectors can absorb the annual

Armed intimidation used against peasants

Pressure on working peasants to give up their land is a major source of injustice in Indonesia and is forcing more and more people into destitution. While the civilian and military authorities together with business interests work closely together to take possession of a highly profitable means of investment, the peasants have no democratic organisation to protect their interests against the armed might of local officialdom.

The Legal Aid Institutes in Jakarta and other cities recently held a Seminar on land disputes. **Sinar Harapan** commented (17 December 1984) that the discussions which were marked by a sense of despondency and gloom, heard a number of peasants speak about their own cases.

4,000 peasant families driven from their land in Lampung

A staggering 4,000 families have been ordered to quit land that they have been cultivating since 1975 in the village of Banding, Wonosobo Sub-District in Lampung District, South Sumatra. The village is composed basically of spontaneous transmigrants (not supported by government funding) from Central Java, and the dispute involves altogether 8,000 hectares of land which was originally forest land. The land was part of a much larger site handed out under a concession to a private company by the forestry department for exploitation in 1970. It was cleared but subsequently left unworked by the company, and was therefore ceded to the new settlers who proceeded to plant coffee bushes and clove trees. Since then, the plantations have provided the peasants with a sizable income.

The forestry department has now decreed however that the land should never have been cleared and has designated it as "protected forest-land", as a result of which all the trees and bushes now in a thriving state of production must be destroyed, even though some officials have conceded that the trees and bushes planted can also perform the function of protecting the soil.

The peasants feel particularly bitter because they are now accused of "land-grabbing" even though the forestry authorities authorised their acquisition of the land in 1975, and made no objections. As "land-grabbers", the peasants have been told that they are entitled to no compensation at all, either for the land or for the trees and bushes that they are now being told they should never have planted. The peasants have also complained about

the intimidation used by the local authorities to force them to leave the land.

One peasant murdered and six more disappear

Six peasants disappeared from their homes last July and have not been heard of since, after being summoned by the local army to give evidence about the murder of a peasant. The families of the six men have been living in a state of fear ever since the disappearances and are too afraid to remain in their own homes. **Kompas**, (8 November), reporting the disappearances, said the men's village, Harjokuncaran, Malang District in East Java, is gripped by fear.

The villager who was murdered was named Sinem, and the murder occurred as the result of a land dispute involving the village head. The six men had been witnesses to the murder, and it is apparently the local authorities who have "spirited" the men away. Many people in the village saw Sinem being cold-bloodedly hacked to death, defending his land. He is, according to **Kompas**, not the only victim to have fallen in the course of this dispute. In 1979 another villager died in an "accident" believed to have been deliberately set up to intimidate the peasants.

The precise details of the land dispute are not clear, but it appears that Sinem, together with other peasants, was the beneficiary of a land distribution decision that has been challenged by the local authorities. He was working on his land despite warnings that he should not do so.

The disappearance of the six men has been strongly condemned by a number of human rights lawyers in Jakarta, who accuse the authorities of failing to provide security and protection for villagers involved in land disputes. T. Mulya Lubis, chairman of the national Legal Aid Institute Foundation (YLBHI) said he was convinced that an organised crime ring was being used by people in authority to intimidate villagers. He was aware of several cases similar to the one that has now come out into the open in Harjokuncaran.

In December, the police chief of the Sub-Area Command in Malang objected to people saying the six had "disappeared". They had simply "not returned home" he said, and claimed that one of them was in Surabaya. **Kompas** said that a team of officials from the police, the military and the prosecutor's office has been formed to find the men.

Continued on from page 17

capital. But, it may be asked, how far will the state permit the emergence of small-scale collective enterprises, when at present the only permitted form of formal agricultural cooperation is the "Village Unit Cooperative" (KUD), an organisation whose domination by wealthy farmers and corrupt officials is an open secret? As **Merdeka's** editors enquired:

If the small farmers are to be amalgamated, will this amalgamation be done through the peasant *arisan* system or small-scale traditional cooperatives (i.e. through small, autonomous forms of traditional peasant cooperation—red.), or will they be sucked into the KUD system? (**Merdeka**, 23/8/84)

While visiting state agricultural research centres in 1984, Minister Affandi has often told the agricultural researchers that their target must be to increase the average income of Indonesia's farmers to 2500 US dollars per year. A commendable goal . . . but if it is to be achieved by "abolishing" the large majority of small farmers and

transferring their land-rights to a small majority of better-off farmers, we hope that the small farmers and other concerned Indonesians will be given the chance to say: "Thanks, but no thanks!"

Jan van Someren

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Dispossessed peasants become the urban poor.

The writer who wasn't meant to survive

Child of All Nations by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Penguin, 1984

It is not often that a novel gives me such deep pleasure. It is not a pleasure that derives from being amused or entertained, but one of political hope. For what Pramoedya reveals in this book, far more than its predecessor in the quartet, (*This Earth of Mankind*, Penguin, 1982) is how well he has survived the vicious oppression that was meted out to him. And if he has, then perhaps others of the many thousands of political prisoners incarcerated for so long in Indonesia during the 1960s-70s have done so too.

Through the central characters of Minke, a budding journalist from the Javanese aristocracy, and his mother-in-law Nyai Ontosoroh, sold as a concubine but now a successful businesswoman, Pramoedya unravels the oppression of the Dutch colonial system in Java. The time is the 1890s and "Lord Sugar", that most profitable and exploitative of colonial export crops, reigns. Minke learns to break out of feudal and colonial structures to listen to those beneath him, peasants and women included, to hear just how the colonial system translates into misery for the mass of the people. But his attempts to publicise their plight flounder, for sugar interests also control information.

Through contact with a young nationalist from mainland China, he hears for the first time that other peoples, the Chinese, the Filipinos, are in revolt. He realises that he has so much to learn, and from sources which his privileged Dutch education had led him least to expect. "This modern age had provided many breasts to suckle me — from among the Natives themselves, from Japan, China, America, India, Arabia, from all the peoples on the face of this earth . . . In humility, I admitted: I was a child of all nations, of all ages, past and present. Place and time of birth, parents, all were coincidence: such things were not sacred."

It is this sense of enquiry, and of the universality of human experience, which make this book such a breath of fresh air. Pramoedya is encouraging his readers to look and listen all around them, to challenge received wisdoms, to form opinions. Sometimes the point seems a bit belaboured, as Minke struggles to comprehend so many new points of view. But the overall message is there: be brave enough to listen, especially to those without power, and have the courage to resist those with power. To Indonesian people, well versed in the interpretation of metaphor, the correspondences between challenging the colonial order in the book

and today's "New Order" in reality will be as clear as a bell.

The Indonesian military government has spent many years trying to stamp out dissent, and unfortunately has been far too successful. Now along comes a quartet of books, available to the popular reader, which tackles suppression head on. Little wonder, then, that the series is banned inside Indonesia, and copies have been seized and burnt. They even succeeded in getting the translator of the books into English, Max Lane, sent home from his post in the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.

But the fury of the Indonesian government must also run deep against Pramoedya himself, precisely because he was not meant to survive, as a writer, as a political being, as a political writer. For many long years on the prison island of Buru he was denied writing equipment. Later, when he was granted the tools, his manuscripts were seized. But he didn't succumb. At first he developed his stories by telling them to his fellow prisoners; later, when international pressure had made the prison authorities allow him to write, the other inmates took on his share of the forced labour to give him time to write, a remarkable example of solidarity. The fruits of those years are what we are now seeing in these and other new publications.

We know that many of those incarcerated did not survive in good shape, physically and/or psychologically, and now live cut-off, tending towards hopelessness and apathy. We cannot berate them, for they suffered greatly. But clearly there are

others, including Pramoedya and Jusuf Ishak, his fellow inmate and publisher of the Indonesian version of these books, who not only came out alive but ready to kick too.

There seems to be something very crucial about those years of isolated comradeship on Buru. To me it is no coincidence that the author and the publisher of this work of dissent, one of the most important in Indonesia in recent years, are former political prisoners. The irony seems to be that while the mass of the Indonesian population had the political stuffing knocked out of them through massive exercises in manipulation and propaganda, some, perhaps many, of those

Letter to the Editor

I am grateful to *TAPOL Bulletin* for reviewing my Sawito thesis (No.66, November 1984). There is however, one important point made by Carmel Budiardjo in the review which I must respond to. I did not state that the Head of the ABRI Fraction in Parliament Major General Domo Pranoto "died at the hands of army security". I referred only (in a footnote) to "unsubstantiated rumours circulated at the time" that this was the case.

With reality as it is, who needs exaggeration?

Yours,

David Bouchier

behind bars kept their ideas intact.

This is primarily why I enjoyed the book so much. But there are other reasons. In this second book the character Annelies died, and frankly it was a relief. Annelies spent most of the first volume unable to overcome the desperate situation into which the racist colonial system had put

Continued on page 20



Pramoedya Ananta Toer with Max Lane, the translator of his books.

Borobudur monument and Solo Kraton attacked

One of Indonesia's main tourist attractions, the Borobudur Temple in Central Java which is the largest Buddhist monument in the world, was the target of a bomb attack on the night of 20-21 January. This is the latest in a series of actions thought to have been launched by Muslim dissidents in their efforts to express protest against government policy and undermine the army's security operations.

Nine *stupas* were badly damaged by explosives and another two bombs failed to go off.

The monument, set up during the golden era of the Sailendra Buddhist empire, took nearly a century to build, from 774 to 864 AD, and cost many thousands of lives. After elaborate restoration in the 19th century by the Dutch, Borobudur was again subjected to a major restoration programme which lasted 14 years and was undertaken under UNESCO supervision at a cost of some \$50 millions. One-fifth of the cost was contributed by Japan, while many West European countries also made contributions. Together with the restoration, a Japanese-financed Tourist Park (Taman Wisata) was built, encroaching on much of the land surrounding the monument and leading to the compulsory eviction of hundreds of peasant families. Victims of these evictions waged a determined struggle for many years to protect their rights (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No.54, November 1982 for a detailed report of the campaign).

The monument covers an area of 117 by 117 meters and rises in nine elaborately decorated terraces to a height of 40 metres. The terraces contain stone relief all the way round. There are altogether 72 *stupas*, each of which contains an image of the Buddha.

Although no one has claimed responsibility for the attack, it is likely to have been intended as a protest against the many Muslim trials now under way and to warn the government that

opposition has not been halted by the many arrests and other security operations since the Tanjung Priok massacre last September.

President Suharto's response has been to accuse the perpetrators of lacking in "national pride". The Minister for Education and Culture, Nugroho Notosusanto, the army's official historian, has meanwhile denied that the attack has any religious significance. He claimed that the monument had long ceased to be a place of worship and was regarded simply as a world-famous historical monument.



The Borobudur *stupas* immediately after the attack.

Stop Press

All the buildings of the *kraton* (palace) of Solo was destroyed by fire on 1 February. The *kraton* is a bastion of Javanese feudal culture in Central Java, and the home of Mrs Suharto. The choice of Borobudur and the *kraton* as targets suggests that the Suharto regime's Javanese cultural roots are coming under attack, though whether from Muslims or disaffected Army circles, or a combination, is difficult to assess.

Continued from page 19

herself, her mother and her lover, other than by swooning for long periods. Is this character drawn from Pramoedya's real life? Even if so, within the context of the book itself Annelies seems highly improbable. For her mother, Nyai Ontosoroh, is a strong woman with an acute analysis of her situation and a life strategy worked out to deal with it. It seemed truly implausible that this woman, who teaches the young Minke so much about developing a critical awareness and then daring to act on it, would tolerate such a doll of a daughter. Not having to confront this major flaw of the first book I could sit back and enjoy Nyai Ontosoroh

herself, marvelling at Pramoedya's courage, rare for a man anywhere but especially in the Indonesian context, to give such an instrumental role to a woman character.

I must also add that this second book seemed to flow much better. I had difficulties with the style of the first. I don't know whether this was due to the original text or to the translation. However, a better rhythm had been found by the second volume.

It crosses my mind to wonder what will be made of these books by readers not familiar with Java and its colonial past. Clearly the author was writing primarily

for his fellow Indonesians, but perhaps Penguin could have persuaded Max Lane to concentrate less on absolute faithfulness to the original text and open the books up more to the international readership. Some of the Indonesian and Dutch words retained in the text could have been translated without loss of authenticity or atmosphere, and not all of them are explained in the glossary. But all congratulations to Penguin for taking on the publication of the English translations, giving Pramoedya the light of day he is denied inside his own country. Personally, I can't wait for the next volume.

Celia Mather

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